Landmark cases on Indian Evidence Act

State of Maharashtra v. Praful Desai (2003): In this case, the Supreme Court of India clarified the rules of admissibility of electronic evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. The court held that electronic evidence, including emails and computer printouts, is admissible in court if it is accompanied by a certificate from a competent person.

R v. Abdul Rahim (1949): This case is one of the earliest cases where the Indian courts recognized the concept of ‘similar facts’ evidence. The court held that evidence of similar facts could be admissible if it showed a pattern of conduct or a common plan.

P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954): This case dealt with the constitutional validity of search warrants. The Supreme Court of India held that search warrants were not in violation of the right to privacy and that documents seized during a lawful search could be used as evidence in court.

M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1961): This case is a landmark judgment on the admissibility of circumstantial evidence in Indian courts. The court held that circumstantial evidence could be used to establish guilt if the circumstances pointed to no other conclusion.

State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1960): This case is notable for its interpretation of the presumption of innocence. The court held that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of criminal law and that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hanumant Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952): This case dealt with the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions. The court held that extra-judicial confessions are admissible in court if they are voluntary and made without any inducement, threat, or promise.

Thapas Berman v. State of Kerala: (S.6)
The Kerala HC held that variation in the evidence regarding the exact time of occurrence are only due to normal errors of observation and normal errors of memory due to lapse of time and errors will always be there and the same cannot be accepted as material discrepancies touching the core of the case. Hence, the court dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction of appellants.

Mirza Akbar v. Emperor AIR (1940): (S. 10)
Facts – This English case revolves around a married couple, Mehr Taja and Ali Askar. Mehr Taja was in an extramarital union with Mirza Akbar. They both intended to marry each other and for that they wanted to get rid of Ali Askar. For the purpose of murdering Ali Askar, they hired Umer Sher. Ali Askar was in turn shot by Umer Sher and Mehr Taja was arrested on charge of conspiracy.
Verdict – Lord Wright said that the provision specifically takes only those facts into consideration which were said, written or done during the conspiracy. The admission made Mehr Taja to the Examiner Magistrate was therefore not considered admissible under the provision although the exchange of letters was within the ambit and hence were admissible

Badri Rai v. State of Bihar (1958) (S. 10)– The SC in this case has held that Section 10 is intentionally enacted to render the acts and statements of a co-conspirator admissible as evidence against the entire group of conspirators, given the nature of the crime.

Binay Kumar and others v. State of Bihar (1996) (S.11)
The Supreme Court stressed upon the fact that the burden of prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt is not reduced by the mere facts that accused has resorted the plea of Alibi. The plea needs to be considered only when the prosecution has discharged its burden satisfactorily.

Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949): (S. 30)
The Bombay High Court in this case held that the confession of the co accused is a weak type of evidence. It is not recorded on oath, nor it is tested by cross examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver as approver gives the testimony under oath and is subjected to cross examination. Therefore, the confession of co-accused cannot be made the basis of conviction.

Kashmira Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh (1952): (S. 30)
The Supreme Court held that the confession of an accused cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence against co-accused.
The principle is that where there is evidence against the co-accused which is sufficient and if the court believes to support his conviction, then confession of co-accused described under Section 30 of IEA may be used as an additional reason for believing that evidence.

Pancho v. State of Haryana (2011): (S. 30)
The Supreme Court held that confession of a co-accused is not a substantive piece of evidence and that it can only be used to confirm the conclusion drawn from other evidence in a criminal trial. The court further stated that the trial court cannot begin on the basis of the confession of the co-accused. Rather, the courts must Analyse all the evidence which are being adduced, and on being satisfied with the guilt of accused.

Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2001): (S. 32)
It was held by the Supreme Court that the admissibility of dying declaration rests upon the principle that a sense of impending death produces in man’s mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath.

Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958): (S. 32)
The Supreme Court laid down the following principles related to dying declaration:
There is no absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be the sole basis of conviction unless corroborated. A true & voluntary declaration needs no corroboration.
A dying declaration is not a weaker kind of evidence than any other piece of evidence.
Each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made.
A dying declaration stands on the same footing as other pieces of evidence & has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances & with reference to the principle governing the weight of evidence.
A dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, &, as far as practicable in the words of the maker of the declaration stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory & human character.

M.Murugan v. The Registrar of the Co-Operative Societies and others (2013) (S.41)
The Madras High Court held that the judgments in rem signified as judgments which are good against all mankind and judgments in personam signified the judgments which are good only against the individuals who are parties to them and their privies.
The point adjudicated upon in a judgment in rem is always as to the status of the res and is conclusive against the world as to that status, whereas in a judgment in personam, the point whatever it may be, which is adjudicated upon, not being as to the status of the res is conclusive only between the parties or privies.

Surinder Kumar and Ors. v. Gyan Chand and Ors. (1957) (S.41)
The Supreme Court held that probate of the Will operates as a judgment in rem, therefore, the objection that the parties in any subsequent proceedings were not parties to it, is not sustainable because of the nature of the judgment.

Vijay v. Union of India (S.63):
The Supreme Court in the matter of this case described the principles relevant for examining the admissibility of secondary evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA).

Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Purya (2004) (S.63)
The Supreme Court held that the terms primary and secondary evidence apply to the kinds of proof that may be given to the contents of a document, irrespective of the purpose for which such contents, when proved, may be received

Arjun Pandit Rao vs. Kailash Kishanrao(2022) (S.65B): The furnishing of certificate under section 65B was made mandatory for admissibility of electronic evidence in the court through this case and oral evidence was held not admissible in this landmark judgment of the supreme court.

Jayantibhai Bhenkerbhai v. State of Gujarat (2002) (S.103)
It was held that the burden of proof upon the accused under Section 103 is undoubtedly heavy. However, while considering the prosecution and the defense evidence if the balance tilts in favor of the accused. The prosecution would fail, and the accused would get the benefit.

Shyam Lal v. Sanjeev Kumar (2009): (S. 112)
Both the plaintiff and the defendant were born while their mother’s marriage to the deceased was legally valid. There was no documented evidence suggesting that the deceased ever lacked access to the mother. Consequently, it was concluded by the SC that there existed a substantial presumption regarding the legitimacy of the child. The Supreme Court held that on the proof of legitimacy of child, there is a strong presumption about the legitimacy of child born out of that wedlock. The presumption can only be rebutted by strong, clear and conclusive evidence

Gautam Kundu v. West Bengal (1993): (S. 112)
The Supreme Court observed that in view of the provision of Section 112 of IEA, there is no scope of permitting the husband to avail of the blood test for dislodging the presumption of legitimacy arising out of this section.
The SC laid down following guidelines:
1. Courts cannot order blood samples as matter of routine.
2. Wherever such prayer is made for inquiry, it must not be entertained.
3. Strong case of non-access must be proved by the husband.
4. The court may carefully examine such request as this may lead branding of child as a bastard and mother as unchaste.
5. No one can be compelled to provide blood samples.

Nandlal Wasudev Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik (2014): (S. 112)
The SC held that the IEA was enacted at the time when modern scientific techniques were not in existence. When the truth is known there is no scope of presumption but where there is conflict between conclusive proof and modern scientific techniques, the latter must prevail over the prior.

Shanti v. State of Haryana (1990): (S.113B)
The Supreme Court decided that Sections 304B and 498A are not mutually exclusive. The Court has ruled that in order to convict someone accused of causing dowry death, the prosecution must present evidence proving that the dowry demand was accompanied by acts of harassment and cruelty.

Satbir Singh & Ors. v. the State of Haryana (2021): (S.113B)
The Supreme Court held that the phrase ‘soon before’ as used in Section 304B cannot be understood to mean ‘exactly before’, the judgement stated.

Chandan v. Emperor (1930): (S. 133)
The Allahabad High Court defined accomplice as one who is associated with an offender or offenders in the commission of a crime or one who knowingly or voluntarily helps and cooperates with others in the commission of the crime.

Shanker v State of Tamil Nadu (1994):(S.133)
The Supreme Court held that when an accomplice becomes an approver, he eventually becomes a prosecution witness.

State of Rajasthan v. Bal Veera (2014): (S.133)
The Supreme Court held that an accomplice will be presumed unworthy until and unless the evidence or testimony provided by him is corroborated by some other material evidence.

Gopal Sarvan v. Satya Narayan (1988):(S. 138)
The Supreme Court observed that if a witness, after being examined in chief does not appear for Cross Examination, no value can be attached to his testimony.